The political desire for this organizational model, however, does not equate to its political possibility. This is the import of Marx's timely reminder that "[m]en make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do not make it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the past" (Brumaire 1). We argue here not against revolutionary strategy as such; contraily, we affirm that strategy and tactics must arise from conditions as they have developed historically. As will shortly become clear, a materialist analysis has dissuaded us from believing that the old capitalist core, its industrial basis hollowed from within according to exigencies of competition-driven development, might provide for the advance of a party along traditional Leninist lines (even with certain modifications). Indeed, the evidence points strongly to the contrary. 4 The collective experience of work and life that gave rise to the vanguard party during the era of industrialization has passed away with industrialization itself. We recognize as materialists that the capital-labor relation that made such a party effective -not only as idea but as reality -is no longer operative. A changed capital-labor relation will give rise to new forms of organization. We should not criticize present-day struggles in the name of idealized reconstructions from the past. Rather, we should describe the communist potential that presents itself immanently in the the limits confronted by today's struggles.
struggles at least partly communist in character, yet not easily assimilated to older organizational logics. The aforementioned thinkers have turned to these events in various ways, seeing in them the actuality that must be grasped by ideas.
We should not assert too swiftly that these currents have run together; they are sometimes river, sometimes riven. It is from this ambiguous historical position that we approach recent work Dean, even more catholic (if less global) in her theoretical assemblage, has along with Slavoj Zizek, been foremost among those revitalizing the question of the party in communist theory.
Routing her agreement through Bosteels, Dean affirms Zizek's proclamation that "a politics without the organizational form of the party is a politics without politics" (Dean 9) . Noting that the question of the party has been equally cast into the fire by the anti-totalizing left and drawn into the abyss by somnolent democratic centralist organizations, Dean seizes on the largely failed promise of the waves of struggle post-2008, corruscatingly skeptical of the "horizontalist" ideology antithetical not just to leadership but formal organization as such. This ideology, often understood as inherited from the alterglobalization movement and purportedly anarchist at its root, offers a political imaginary which, in multiple accounts including Dean's, draws its internal logic not from a rejection of hierarchy but a 3 replication of frictionlessly networked neoliberal marketspace: "This is movement as commodity and fashion choice" (Dean 245) .
Likely all would admit that this political model offered certain virtues (not least an appealing sense of participatory possibility); it seemed as well to reach real limits. Now, in the face of its failure, the question of organization must again present itself. The political force and demand of what might be called "program without apologies," unremitting in its insistence on the political desirability of party and state form toward seizure of production, and absent any undue patience for the caviling of beautiful souls, has been Dean's signal contribution to political thought. The vanguard party maintains "the collective desire for collectivity....As it learns from the struggling masses, the party provides a vehicle through which they can understand their actions and express their collective will, much as the psychoanlyst provides a means for the analysand to become conscious of her desire" (Dean 207, 243) .
The political desire for this organizational model, however, does not equate to its political possibility. This is the import of Marx's timely reminder that "[m]en make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do not make it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the past" (Brumaire 1). We argue here not against revolutionary strategy as such; contraily, we affirm that strategy and tactics must arise from conditions as they have developed historically. As will shortly become clear, a materialist analysis has dissuaded us from believing that the old capitalist core, its industrial basis hollowed from within according to exigencies of competition-driven development, might provide for the advance of a party along traditional Leninist lines (even with certain modifications). Indeed, the evidence points strongly to the contrary. 4 The collective experience of work and life that gave rise to the vanguard party during the era of industrialization has passed away with industrialization itself. We recognize as materialists that the capital-labor relation that made such a party effective -not only as idea but as reality -is no longer operative. A changed capital-labor relation will give rise to new forms of organization. We should not criticize present-day struggles in the name of idealized reconstructions from the past. Rather, we should describe the communist potential that presents itself immanently in the the limits confronted by today's struggles.
In making this argument, we anticipate the following objection:
if the demand for the party as a route toward a communist social relation is foreclosed in the deindustrialized core of capitalism's home counties, might the material conditions amenable to the class/mass/party sequence still exist elsewhere, in the industrial zones of the "Global South"?
We take this question of the party beyond the overdeveloped economies of the initial OECD nations to be a critical area of research and potential place of struggle, and one not yet adequately addressed. This is the simplest formulation of the matter toward which we might orient ourselves via Dean and Bosteels, via the one's insistence on a given organizational strategy, and the other's salutary recommendation that we understand this as a global question to be extricated from the anglo-european theatre. The party, then -but elsewhere.
If Dean and Bosteels provide our initial coordinates, a sort of pole star but bipolar, our own compass will be that of political economy and its critique -not as complement to, but as inseparable element of, the historically concrete dimension of communist thought. For it is this orientation which inaugurates communism as an historical possibility rather than a horizon or ideal. It is this insistence on evaluating proposed politics not 5 according to their desirability but their material possibility that will safeguard us from drifting into the wide Sargasso of left idealism.
VALUE AND PROGRAM
Class struggle, among its many descriptions, mediates between the value-relation and the mode of production. Surplus value is "the invisible essence of capital," in Marx's words (Capital Vol. 3, 134) ; the struggle over its appropriation puts the class relation at the center of this mode of production. The mode of production is then the historical category wherein communism becomes possible within given material conditions. To think communism as possibility, historical circumstance and the motion of value must be thought together as they have developed together in an unfolding dialectic; changes in the latter cannot be disarticulated from changes in the former. It is class struggle that articulates them as social fact, such that they move together.
As we are insisting that there is no thinking the concrete possibility of communism without reference to the seeming abstraction of value theory, we must here offer a brief specification of what is meant by that contested term. We do not particularly mean the more-and-less Hegelian varieties of "valueform theory," of late largely a German disease best known under the name of Neue Marx-Lekture. Rather, value theory here designates something closer to the arguably more pragmatic and even empirical tradition, often anglophone, interested less in the kinds of consciousness that correspond to the value-relation than in the "moving contradiction" of the Grundrisse. "Capital itself is the moving contradiction," Marx notes, following with the crucial specification of this contradiction's contents:
capital "presses to reduce labour time to a minimum, while it 6 posits labour time, on the other side, as sole measure and source of wealth" (Grundrisse 706).
That is to say, it is the historical dynamic between profit and accumulation, price and value. Thus the moving contradiction appears within capitalism as the restructurations of capital's schemes for reproducing itself, under duress from changes in its own composition -changes which include both class composition as well as the technical and organic composition of capital, that is, the ratios of both the mass and value ratios of constant to variable capital in the production process. The post-industrial "new economy," i.e., is not some new way of producing value; it is what an economy looks like that has achieved a certain value composition in industry. Such restructurations are neither aid nor impediment to Marx's "real movement which abolishes the present state of things"; they are the real movement, expressed in the categories of political economy (German Ideology 57).
Value itself is a not a substance but a social relation within which capitalist accumulation is possible, within which the law of value might assert itself. Dean is rightly skeptical of understanding the proletariat as "an empirical class" -as are Marx and those who take up his analytic tools. Hence the useful distinction between "the working class" as a positivist designation devised by factory inspectors, and "the proletariat" as a structural position, one that moves and changes both internally and in its external relation. The proletariat is that class which, "without reserves," is separated from its capacities; into the opposition of workers and means of production enters the value form as mediation. It is a category through which we might understand a past era and our distance from it, as well as the present and its particularities, the concrete circumstance available to present struggle.
Here we might take a last thought from Postone, one left frustratingly incomplete. Before letting it drop, he suggests that the task of understanding the basis of traditional Marxism 9 would involve taking up the tension between Capital Volumes 1 and 3, which he rightly understands as tilting toward analyses of value and of price, and thus capital as seen from the positions of production and distribution respectively (Postone 134) .
The contradiction between value and price, wherein the fratricidal intercapitalist struggle for profit must expel labor from the production process, increases the organic composition of capital and identically the ratio of surplus to productive labor.
It is these changes that correspond to the eclipse of the worker's movements in the now post-industrial core.
To argue that there is a set of relations that unify the value/price dynamic, the eclipse of the worker's movement, and the foreclosure of programmatism in these nations is no great matter. Dean writes that "In the US, the political power of organized labor has diminished together with the substantial decline in private sector union membership, the spread of an individualist conception of work, and the realignments within the Democratic Party. The importance of manufacturing and industrial production has likewise decreased as the US economy has shifted away from the production of goods and toward the provision of services." Citing Judith Stein on the exchange of factories for finance, the passage concludes that said process "is generally linked to a shift to neoliberal economic policies" .
All of this is true, but any underlying historical dynamic goes unremarked. For all our dialectical delicatesse, if we are to speak of what it would mean to enter into communist struggle, we must sometimes speak of causes. Why did these shifts happen?
Surely we aren't meant to believe it was the spread of certain conceptions, or parliamentary realignments arising ex nihilo. If this resists specification, it may be because neoliberalism itself lacks specificity. Indeed, it is not a coherent object of study. No doubt the era has its ideologues, but neoliberalism isn't an ideology, a plan, or set of policies except in the sense that any aggregate of things that were done is a set of policies.
It is a dog's dinner of ad hoc ploys, by turns virtuoso and ungainly, attempting to restore profitability to the US-centered cycle of accumulation in train of the secular collapse in profits around 1973 . The partial restoration that follows before again failing, however, shifts profits to sectors which generate price but not new value -sectors which are zero sum (i.e. finance and insurance), or in which increased valuations are nominal (real estate). This in turn assures the intensifying recurrence of crisis, and the increasing production of nonproduction, which appears as surplus capacity and surplus population. It is in this situation -fewer workers generating less value, much as Marx foresaw -that programmatism, however desirable, ceases to be the form of struggle available.
CLASS COMPOSITION AND COMMUNIST CONTENT
Thus the great puzzle of the claim that "a politics without the organizational form of the party is a politics without politics."
The formulation effectively constitutes organization and party as normative, offering a "required standard" and therefore an Absent material analysis of the trajectories of the twentiethcentury workers movement, they rather admit that actually existing socialism was a disaster, and swiftly turn from the wreckage: now we must have the courage to try again! But then, the whole point of a Leninist materialist politics, unlike anarchist or utopian socialist idealism, was that the strength of the party, the probability or in some versions the inevitability of its success, was based in a tendency of social reality itself. What was the material basis of the party strategy?
The environment of the party was the labor movement, in essence.
The expanding power of that movement was given in the expansion and then the industrialization of the class. That is to say, the people -fundamentally disunited in distinct classes: peasants, shopkeepers, artisans, the lumpen -had to be transformed into 12 the proletariat, as the class with radical chains, the class "without reserves." But then, in a second moment, this proletariat had to be industrialized. Industrialization would take the formal transmogrification (people into the proletariat) and give it a material expression, an organic unity.
Thus, the party did not just sum and average the interests of workers, or provide a compromise among class fractions. Instead of representing a constituency, à la bourgeois parliamentary parties, it must present an organic unity of class interests.
Industrialization would materially transform the class, the "in itself," which might then become "for itself" by making proletarians' class-belonging the most important fact about them.
Party cadres were not expected to overcome the internal division among proletarians -race, gender, trade, religion, local or regional origin, nationality -by force of will. These were solids that would melt into air, holies profaned. Cadres instead expressed the coming into being of proletarians' self-consistency as such, supported by the tendency of reality itself.
It is according to this reality that industrialization indexes the growing strength of the class in movement and the capacity of the party to present class interests in an organic fashion. Hence also the metaphors of the party likened unto a machine, or the class as a machine put to work by the party. It is a class homogenized and trained by the motions of the machine, in the factory, to act in concert, not only economically but also politically. These metaphors are not incidental. Hence also the vanishing of this party form's possibility along with the end of programmatism in the core, indexed by the limit of industrialization. When actual machines replace the living labor of class and party machine to such a degree that the internal unity of the proletariat is broken, the dream of program, with or without apologies, is at an end. The question is the obverse of the Arrighian finding that when the center of the capitalist world system shifts, it transfers to a container of power with an economy still ascending its industrial phase, i.e., one which features a lower organic composition of capital, where investment-driven productivity has not yet reached limits of profitability, the dialectical development of value production is in its glorious springtime, and thus provides an economy which might more effectively soak up mobile capital in search of better returns .
There is a trajectory of capital's development, that is to say, that moves with the moving contradiction of the value form. There are moments along that arc when a worker's movement can achieve both the scope and unity to provide the environment for a mass party, before deindustrialization sets in. We are further down 15 value's rainbow here, but might matters be different elsewhere? Might Dean's communism be best considered for its actuality in something like Bosteels' elsewhere, albeit for somewhat different reasons than either suggest? It is with this question in mind that we turn to some suggestive data, in hopes of glimpsing shadows cast by the moving contradiction and the dialectic of capital, espying in them the currency of the party form.
Looked at from one angle, that is, comparatively, the periphery seems ripe for a programmatist politics, since capital accumulation is now proceeding there at rates greater than the core. This is a historically new phenomenon: the long-term trend in the global economy has not been one of convergence between peripheral and core economies. "Catch-up" has been extremely rare; its exemplars (the USSR, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan) can be counted on one hand (Allen 6) . For the rest, the long-term trend has been "divergence, big time" (Pritchett 3). In the past few decades, however, this trend seems to have reversed itself, at least for the BRICS. Convergence has proceeded rapidly in China and India, which have achieved growth rates superior to the OECD for three decades (beginning albeit from extremely low GDP-percapita levels). In Brazil and South Africa (as in Russia) growth has been shakier. There too, however, growth rates accelerated after 2003 (OECD 15).
Not only has capital accumulation in the BRICS proceeded at a fast pace, suggesting a 'take-off' in some of the largest countries in the world, by population.
This seeming "take-off" in some of the globe's most populous countries, suggested by rapid capital accumulation, has been accompanied by a major shift in the location of global manufacturing, both in terms of output and employment. Developed By contrast, at its height in early 1970s, manufacturing accounted for around 27 percent of the workforce in the developed countries, and more than that in Germany, Japan and the UK (UNCTAD 95).
Patterns of peripheral industrialization have not replicated those of the core. It is true that an exodus from agriculture has 17 taken place; concomitantly, the population has shifted into urban areas, in tandem with a massive increase in total population. Despite a geographically uneven unfolding, these trends have followed the well-worn paths cut by the advanced capitalist countries -albeit on a much larger scale. Yet, in the core, the population released from agriculture found itself divided more or less equally into industrial and service occupations (industry is a broader category than manufactures, as it includes construction, mining and utilities). At its peak in 1973, industry accounted for 47 percent of employment in Germany, 37 percent in Japan, and 41 percent in the UK (BLS table 2-7). Such developments early on enabled a vision wherein the industrial proletariat would come to make up the majority of the population.
In some industrial towns (though not administrative cities) the industrial proletariat was already a majority in 1900. Here it is necessary to add to the comments above, concerning the material unification of proletarians: the importance of industry in the classical workers movement was not only about unification, but also about power, the power to shut down production. That power was wielded effectively in strikes at auto plants in the 1970s and 1980s: those strikes were able to force huge blocks of fixed capital to stand idle, at great expense to capital. But such power hardly exists for many industrial proletarians today in the BRICS; its eclipse is that of the workers movements. The staggering, back-footed social democracy of associated parties measures this powerlessness with acuity.
None of these queries should be read as implying that the industrial workforce plays no role in social antagonism today, or 21 that the vision of a unified proletariat, its interest presented organically by the party, is now simply to be replaced by the fantasy of an internally differentiated mass subject -as if the problem of unification could simply be sublated into the shared character of difference. The key question of the political composition of the class, today, remains unanswered. Instead of a composition, there is a "composition problem" (Endnotes 47) .
Within the terms of that problem, the industrial proletariat (and in addition, the organized class fractions outside of industry: in education, health care, sanitation, and so on) plays a key role in struggles. Witness the Arab Spring, wherein rolling strikes played a major role in bringing down long-standing dictators. The industrial working class continues to present itself as a key minority, but one which no longer bears a universal interest. Instead, it confronts a diverse class, spread out in the vast informal sector, which encapsulates "one half to three-quarters of non-agricultural employment in developing countries" (ILO 7).
CODA: DIALECTICS AT A GALLOP
This is only the briefest survey of the data. Some preliminary conclusions might nonetheless be drawn. It is not clear that there are significant labor-intensive and value-productive sectors in the BRICS (or elsewhere) of the sort that accompanied the formation of the SPD in Germany or the rise of the worker's movement in the US, nor does labor-intensive collective agriculture seem likely to play an outsized role in world history, as it once did across the global periphery.
In short, the historical conditions in which programmatism -and the preservation of capitalist production under worker controlprovided the horizon for a communist or quasi-communist politics are certainly more closely matched in BRICS nations than in the capitalist core. But the dissimilarity is far greater than the 22 generic likeness. They seem to have moved more swiftly along the value trajectory than did emerging powers of the nineteenth and twentieth century. As the critical moment of hegemonic unraveling arrives, they have arguably passed the point in which they might either, on the one hand, take over as new hegemon of a capitalist world-system according to the Arrighian schema, or on the other, ground an antithetical state program. The dialectic, as it were, is moving faster, racing along at breakneck pace. Whether or not one finds the formulations handed down to us from the programmatist era seductive -particularly against the pathos of recent failures -it remains difficult to affirm their actuality.
We do not think it is evident what a communist transition would look like and are thus disinclined to reject possibilities out of hand. We wish only to ground our analysis in the intransigent material particulars of our historical moment rather than in any normative politics. From this standpoint, a communist critique of political economy does not particularly put the program of party organization toward the seizure of state power on offer.
